A Latin-American/Spanish edition of the medieval classic. Boethius' treatises on meditation and beauty are still valid to this very day.

Many philosophers hold that if an agent acts intentionally, she must know what she is doing. Although the scholarly consensus for many years was to reject the thesis in light of presumed counterexamples by Donald Davidson, several scholars have recently argued that attention to aspectual distinctions and the practical nature of this knowledge shows that these counterexamples fail. In this paper I defend a new objection against the thesis, one modelled after Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. Since this argument relies on (...) general principles about the nature of knowledge rather than on intuitions about fringe cases, the recent responses that have been given to defuse the force of Davidson’s objection are silent against it. Moreover, the argument suggests that even weaker theses connecting practical entities with knowledge are also false. Recent defenders of the thesis that there is a necessary connection between knowledge and intentional action are motivated by the insight that this connection is non-accidental. I close with a positive proposal to account for the non-accidentality of this link without appeal to necessary connections by drawing an extended analogy between practical and perceptual knowledge. (shrink)

Much of our know-how is acquired through practice: we learn how to cook by cooking, how to write by writing, and how to dance by dancing. As Aristotle argues, however, this kind of learning is puzzling, since engaging in it seems to require possession of the very knowledge one seeks to obtain. After showing how a version of the puzzle arises from a set of attractive principles, I argue that the best solution is to hold that knowledge-how comes in degrees, (...) and through practice a person gradually learns how to do something. However, the two standard accounts of know-how in the literature, intellectualism and anti-intellectualism, cannot properly account for the distinctive way in which know-how is gradually acquired by practice, a process in which conceptual representations and practical abilities are intimately interwoven. Drawing on Gareth Evans's work, I outline an account that may do so, and use this account to distinguish between two forms of learning to explain why skill generally cannot be learnt through testimony, and requires practice. (shrink)

This paper investigates ‘authoritative knowledge’, a neglected species of practical knowledge gained on the basis of exercising practical authority. I argue that, like perceptual knowledge, authoritative knowledge is non-inferential. I then present a broadly reliabilist account of the process by which authority yields knowledge, and use this account to address certain objections.

aristotle closes the second common book of his ethical treatises by considering a number of puzzles about wisdom and φρόνησις,1 devoting the bulk of his attention to a puzzle about the usefulness of the latter. Briefly, the puzzle is that if φρόνησις is useful insofar as it enables us to act virtuously, it will be useless both to the virtuous person, who naturally acts well without possessing it, and to the non-virtuous person, so long as someone else tells her how (...) to act. Either way, it would seem, possessing φρόνησις is useless. There is agreement among scholars that Aristotle’s reply depends on the following biconditional claim: Virtue-Φρόνησις... (shrink)

A central debate in philosophy of action concerns whether agential knowledge, the knowledge agents characteristically have of their own actions, is inferential. While inferentialists like Sarah Paul hold that it is inferential, others like Lucy O’Brien and Kieran Setiya argue that it is not. In this paper, I offer a novel argument for the view that agential knowledge is non-inferential, by posing a dilemma for inferentialists: on the first horn, inferentialism is committed to holding that agents have only alienated knowledge (...) of their own actions; on the second horn, inferentialism is caught in a vicious regress. Neither option is attractive, so inferentialism should be rejected. (shrink)

Subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI), the view that whether a subject knows depends on the practical stakes, has been charged with ‘knowledge laundering’: together with widely held knowledge-transmission principles, SSI appears to allow improper knowledge acquisition. I argue that this objection fails because it depends on faulty versions of transmission principles that would raise problems for any view. When transmission principles are properly understood, they are shown to be compatible with SSI because they do not give rise to improper knowledge acquisition. The (...) upshot is a better understanding of the nature and structure of these transmission principles. (shrink)

The lysosome serves as a site for delivery of materials targeted for removal from the eukaryotic cell. The mechanisms underlying the biogenesis of this organelle are currently the subject of renewed interest due to advances in our understanding of the protein sorting machinery. Genetic model systems such as yeast and Drosophila have been instrumental in identifying both protein and lipid components of this machinery. Importantly, many of these components, as well as the processes in which they are involved, are proving (...) conserved in mammals. Other recently identified components, however, appear to be unique to higher eukaryotes. BioEssays 23:333–343, 2001. Published 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

In Piñeros Glasscock (2020) I presented a version of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument against the Anscombean thesis that intentional action entails knowledge. I defend this argument from recent criticisms by Beddor and Pavese (2022) and Valaris (2021). I argue that contrary to what my past self and my critics suggest, the conclusion of this anti-luminosity argument does not rest on the existence of essentially intentional actions. The argument can be recast based on the humbler premise that agential cognition must represent actions (...) as intentional. I show that this claim is well motivated by precisely the considerations of control behind the objections. (shrink)

Philosophers and psychologists sometimes categorize emotions like surprise and curiosity as specifically epistemic. Is there some reasonably unified and interesting class of emotions here? If so, what unifies it? This paper proposes and defends an evaluative account of epistemic emotions: What it is to be an epistemic emotion is to have fittingness conditions that distinctively involve some epistemic evaluation. We argue that this view has significant advantages over alternative proposals and is a promising way to identify a limited and interesting (...) class of emotions. (shrink)

Review of Tamar Schapiro, 'Feeling Like It'.

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

The global market for biologics and biosimilar pharmaceutical products is experiencing rapid expansion, primarily driven by the continuous discovery of new molecules. However, information regarding Latin America’s biological market remains limited.

La transición del siglo XIX al XX supone una quiebra de paradigma que afecta al conjunto de los saberes. Desde la ciencia hasta la estética, pasando por la filosofía, el paradigma moderno se ve sometido a un proceso de erosión que desembocará en lo que algunos denominan Posmodernidad. La presente obra supone una aproximación al pensamiento contemporáneo, buscando las raíces de su especificidad en la profunda mutación discursiva con que se alumbra el siglo XX. Esta aproximación, lejos de ser una (...) mera descripción, se realiza desde una vocación crítica que subraya aquellos elementos del discurso actual que pueden convertirse en herramienta para la construcción de un pensamiento antagonista. (shrink)

El registro de la personalidad de Pablo, su formación intelectual y su misión hacen de él un hombre de controversias y de originalidades en su discurso. Este artículo pretende describir: (a) la estructura argumentativa de la llamada 'carta a Filemón' (Fm), texto considerado de autoría paulina, y (b) las maniobras estratégicas que desarrolla el autor del documento para resolver la discusión crítica, específicamente a partir del uso de estrategias de cortesía verbal. En términos generales, desde un análisis dialéctico, la carta (...) nos presenta el pedido del prisionero para que Filemón reciba a Onésimo de regreso en su casa, así como los argumentos que favorecen esta postura. Al insertar las maniobras estratégicas, es decir, el elemento pragmático y retórico, se puede observar un cambio en el punto de vista y en el argumento. Las estrategias de cortesía verbal ayudan, por un lado, a que la comunidad acoja a Onésimo y, por otro lado, aprenda que los cristianos han sido generados por la fe en Cristo. Por tanto, no sólo se declara la petición, sino una nueva verdad de fe y una práctica de vida eclesial y social. Pablo salvaguarda la imagen negativa, apelando a un nuevo estilo de autoridad y a una renovada forma de vida comunitaria que va más allá del contexto específico en el que fue escrita la carta. Todo hombre y mujer de fe son miembros dignos de la comunidad porque son “mis entrañas” (Fm 12b). (shrink)

Perspectivas: una aproximación al pensamiento ético y político contemporáneo recoge algunas de las conferencias pronunciadas en unas jornadas sobre pensamiento crítico, tituladas ¿Liquidar la Modernidad?, que tuvieron lugar en la Biblioteca María Moliner de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad de Zaragoza en 2010. Y por otro lado, recopila las cuatro intervenciones que se produjeron en una jornada sobre pensamiento contemporáneo que, dirigida a profesorado de enseñanza secundaria, tuvo lugar en el Paraninfo de la Universidad de Zaragoza (...) el 26 de noviembre de 2011. El libro pretende también contribuir a establecer vínculos estrechos entre el Departamento de Filosofía y el profesorado de secundaria con el fin, entre otras cuestiones, de implicarse en la mejor preparación del alumnado de cara a la Prueba de Acceso a la Universidad y de facilitar la tarea docente del profesorado. En ese sentido, y puesto que actualizar el programa, dando cabida al siglo XX, parecía una cuestión necesaria, se ha configurado una aproximación a algunos autores y autoras contemporáneos, en la dimensión ética y/o política de su pensamiento, que también puede resultar útil para el profesorado de Filosofía en enseñanza secundaria. (shrink)

Filosofía de la historia, Juan Bautista Vico.--Consideraciones sobre el cristianismo.--Antecedentes para la inteligencia de la cuestión de Oriente.--Discurso acerca de las relaciones de España con otras potencias.--Discurso sobre la dictadura.--Cartas relacionadas con el discurso sobre la dictadura.--Discurso sobre la situación general de Europa.--Discurso sobre la situación de España.